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NOTE
Toward Lome III: Perfecting the European
Community's African Partnership
by Daniel Girard*
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community (EEC) is linked by treaty1
with 64 developing African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP
states).2 Under the terms of the Second Lom6 Convention (Lom6 I),s the
* J.D. Candidate, University of California (1984); B.A., Cornell University (1979)f Upon
graduation, associated with Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco.
Special thanks to Professor Kojo Yelpaala, McGeorge School of Law, for his encourage-
ment and technical assistance, to Professor Robert Hillman, University of California, for his
advice and support and to Ms. Martha Girard for processing the final draft.
1 European Economic Community-African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries: Docu-
ments from Lom6 Il Meeting, Oct. 31, 1979, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Lom6 II]. Lom6 H was preceded by a previous agreement also signed at Lom6,
Togo. European Economic Community-African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries: Docu-
ments from Lom6 Meeting, Feb. 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 LL.M. 595 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Lom6 I].
2 The ACP countries are classified by Lom6 H as follows:
(a) defined as "least developed"
Antigua and Barbuda
Belize
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Djibouti
Dominica
Equatorial Guinea
Mauritania
Niger
Rwanda
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome Principe
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ACP states enjoy the privilege of exporting products to the EEC "free of
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect.' 4 The ACP states
benefit from a system of compensatory financing designed to minimize
the effect of fluctuations in commodity and mineral export earnings.5
Lom6 II also provides programs for industrial, agricultural, commercial
and technical cooperation between the states.6 Moreover, the ACP states
are beneficiaries of a financial aid package worth approximately $6.9 bil-
lion.7 However, some scholars assert that the Lom6 agreements merely
ensure EEC access to raw materials and a vast market for processed
goods, which perpetuates a historical pattern of colonial exploitation.'
This Comment examines the Lom6 treaty's so called "safeguard
Ethiopia Tanzania
Gambia Togo
Grenada Tonga
Guinea Tuvalu
Guinea-Bissau Uganda
Kiribati Upper Volta
Lesotho Vanuatu
Malawi Western Samoa
Mali
(b) Landlocked or island countries not defined as "least developed"
Bahamas Mauritius
Barbados Papua-New Guinea
Fiji Trindad & Tobago
Jamaica Zambia
Madagascar
(c) others
Cameroon Liberia
Congo Nigeria
Gabon Senegal
Ghana Surinam
Guyana Zaire
Ivory Coast Zimbabwe
Kenya
St. Christopher and Nevis has not yet been classified. Telephone conversation with F. Pil-
livuyt, Information Officer, Public Information Office of the European Economic Commu-
nity (Apr. 2, 1984).
3 See supra note 1.
4 Lom6 II, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 343 (art. 2(1)).
8 Simmonds, The Second Lom Convention: The Innovative Features, 17 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 415, 419 (1980).
* Id. at 423-32.
* Id. at 426. The amount of EEC aid to the ACP states was a critical element in both
Lom6 negotiations. Under Lom6 II, ACP states were to receive 62 percent more financial
assistance than under Lom6 I. ACP firms and nationals were also granted broader discretion
in the evaluation and implementation of projects. Id. at 426-28.
6 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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clause," which enables the EEC to take protective action should Lom6
H's liberal market access provisions threaten the EEC's internal economy.
The EEC's power to act unilaterally to suspend the Lom6 II trade provi-
sions may interfere with the industrial development of the ACP states.
The safeguard clause is drafted in general terms which provide that
necessary safeguard measures may be taken if "difficulties arise which
may result in a deterioration in a sector of the economy ... or a region"
of the community. 10 The scope of the clauses's definitional phrases has
not been litigated1 because the EEC's power to act is discretionary. The
EEC retais broad power to suspend or restrict the importation of goods
originating in ACP states.12
The negotiators of the Lom6 agreements have sought to establish
their trade relationship on the basis of "complete equality between part-
ners. 13 In the fleld of trade cooperation, the object of both Lom6 I and
Lom III has been to improve the balance of ACP-EEC trade by accelerat-
ing the growth rate of ACP trade.'4 The unequal nature of a relationship
I Lom6 U, supra note 1, 19 LL.M. at 344 (art. 12). Lom6 H's safeguard clause is as
follows:
1. If, as a result of applying the provisions of this Chapter, serious disturbances
occur in a sector of the economy of the Community or of one or more of its Mem-
ber States, or jeopardize their external financial stability, or if difficulties arise
which may result in a deterioration in a sector of the economy of the Community
or of a region thereof, the Community may take, or may authorize, the Member
State concerned to take, safeguard measures. These measures, their duration and
their methods of application shall be notified immediately to the Council of
Ministers.
2. The Community and its Member States undertake not to use safeguard mea-
sures or other means for protectionist purposes or to hamper structural
development.
3. These safeguard measures shall be restricted to those which would least dis-
turb trade between the Contracting Parties in implementing the objectives of the
Convention and must not exceed the scope of what is strictly necessary to remedy
the difficulties that have arisen.
4. Safeguard measures shall, at the time of their application, take account of the
existing level of the ACP exports concerned to the Community and their potential
for development.
10 Id.
n This safeguard clause has never been formally invoked, and barring extreme circum-
stances, its use is unlikely. See McQueen, LomW and the Protective Effect of the Rules of
Origin, 16 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 119, 120 (1982). However, the EEC has used the clause to
pressure ACP states to "voluntarily" agree to export restraints. See infra note 147 and ac-
companying text.
1 Lom6 II, supra note 1, 19 LL.M. at 344-45 (arts. 12-15).
13 Lom6 I, supra note 1, 14 I.L.M. at 604 (preamble).
1 Id. at 607 (art. 1). Lom6 I provides that-
In the field of trade co-operation, the object.., is to promote trade between
the Contracting Parties, taking account of their respective levels of development,
and in particular, of the need to secure additional benefits for the trade of the
1984
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is explicitly recognized.15
The safeguard powers of the EEC are at odds with the stated objec-
tives of the Lom6 agreements. Given the scope of the Lom6 safeguard
clause, any significant export achievement by an ACP undertaking may
give rise to circumstances in which the safeguard clause would arguably
apply. However, to require the EEC or its Member States to divest them-
selves of the right to take protective measures in the face of a damaging
import trend is unreasonable. Nevertheless, under the present arrange-
ment, the ability of ACP states to plan their economies and attract for-
eign direct investment may be unnecessarily impaired. 6
By injecting an element of uncertainty in the ACP-EEC trade rela-
tionship, the clause makes ACP states less attractive targets for direct
investors of non-EEC developed countries. Planners within the ACP
states must also contend with the safeguard clause's limiting effect on the
market access provisions of Lom6 II. Moreover, the EEC's right to take
protective measures without consultation undermines the partnership
which the parties have sought to establish.
This Comment traces the development of safeguard clauses in the
ACP-EEC partnership in light of the historical pattern of Eurafrican
trade. Part I briefly recounts the initial character of Europe's trade with
Africa. Part II discusses the incorporation of Europe's African colonies in
the EEC and the association regime1 7 which followed African indepen-
dence. Part IlI introduces Lom6 I and II and the shift from association to
partnership. The effect of the Lom6 agreements on the industrialization
of the ACP states is assessed in Part IV. An alternative safeguard system
which provides the ACP states with guaranteed access to EEC markets is
set forth in Part V. Finally, in Part VI, the role of the proposed safeguard
system in perfecting the ACP-EEC partnership is discussed.
ACP States, in order to accelerate the growth of their trade and improve the con-
ditions of access of their products to the market of the European Economic Com-
munity ....
Article 1 of Lomb II is cast in similar language. Lom6 II, supra note 1, 19 LL.M. at 342-43
(art. 1).
15 See supra. note 14.
16 Yelpaala, The Lom6 Conventions and the Political Economy of the African-Carib-
bean-Pacific Countries: A Critical Analysis of the Trade Provisions, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 807, 878-79 (1980). Yelpaala considers the safeguard clause to be one of seven basic
issues which future conventions must confront. Formal criteria governing the use of safe-
guard clauses would "facilitate ACP export and investment planning for the EEC markets."
Id. at 879.
17 See infra notes 47-88 and accompanying text.
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II. INITIAL ASPECTS OF EURAFRICAN TRADE: AFRICA AS A SOURCE OF RAW
MATERIALS AND A MARKET FOR MANUFACTURED GOODS
The current pattern of Africa's trade with Europe developed in the
late 19th century.' s European colonial enterprises sought to counteract
falling profit margins at home' 9 through the use of inexpensive labor and
Africa's abundant natural resources. 0 African populations subsequently
served as markets for products manufactured in Europe's industrial cen-
ters.2 ' A perceived need to protect trade relations2 2 led the major Euro-
pean powers to claim vast sections of the African continent.2 3 At the Ber-
lin Conference in 1884,24 European statesmen partitioned Africa into
protectorates which could be exploited with a minimum of outside
interference.25
18 Yansane, Decolonization, Dependency, and Development in Africa: The Theory Re-
visited, in DECOLONIZATION AND DEPENDENCY 4 (A. Yansane ed. 1980). Aside from the mas-
sive slave trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Europe's trade with Africa
consisted largely of barter with African middlemen in search of precious metals. Africa also
produced modest quantities of gum, ivory, timber, animal skins and cereals. R. HALLUT,
AFRICA SINCE 1875, at 15 (1974).
19 Amos, Relations Between Africa and Europe in Historical Perspective, 13 U. GHANA
L.J. 7, 26-27 (1976).
20 Id. at 28. After the mid-nineteenth century, the range of African exports increased
dramatically with such products as wool, cotton, palm oil, groundnuts (peanuts) and cloves
being produced for European consumption. By the early twentieth century, Africa was also
producing sugar, rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, sisal, tobacco and a variety of fruits. African
mines were also supplying foreign markets with diamonds, gold, tin, copper, bauxite, manga-
nese ore, iron ore, phosphates, oil and natural gas. R. HALLET, supra note 18, at 15.
11 In the early nineteenth century, African raw materials were exchanged for textiles
and metalware. Gradually, more sophisticated goods were imported. Foodstuffs acquired in
trade included tea, beer, rice, sugar, dried fish and flour. Africans also received building
materials such as cement, glass and corrugated iron, along with tools and firearms. Internal
trade insured the distribution of these items from the major towns to the countryside. R.
HALLET, supra note 18, at 14.
22 Sanderson, Partition: Coincidence or Conjecture? in EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM AND THE
PARTITION OF AFRICA 10 (E. Penrose ed. 1975). See generally H. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL Ex-
PERIENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1870, at 48-49 (1977).
23 H. WILSON, supra note 22, at 82.
U The Berlin conference was called by Chancellor Bismarck of Germany and lasted
from Nov. 1884 to Feb. 1885. The participants passed resolutions against slave trade, in
favor of free trade, and on the need to prove effective occupation before annexing new terri-
tories. The Berlin conference established the ground rules for the territorial acquisitions
which took place in the next twenty years. R. OLIVER & J. FAGE, A SHORT HISTORY OF AFRICA
186-95 (1963).
23 Amos, supra note 19, at 27-28; see Sanderson, supra note 22, at 10-12. In the thirty
years following the Berlin Conference, Africa was almost entirely occupied by seven Euro-
pean powers. France acquired the largest portion of the African continent, claiming the
North-African states of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco as well as French West Africa, French
Equatorial Africa and the island of Madagascar. The British dominated territories included
Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, British East Africa, Egypt, the Anglo-Egyp-
1984 NOTE
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
African colonization contributed to the expansion of Europe's econ-
omy in the post-industrial era.26 The terms of Europe's trade with Africa
in the late 19th century were unilaterally defined by economic27 and mili-
tary coercion.28 Africa was primarily developed to supply crops and raw
materials to meet European needs,2 9 but the colonies also provided a mar-
ket for Europe's manufactured goods.30
This system of trade favored Europe at the expense of local economic
development. Most of the industrial development which took place in
non-mining areas3 l centered around the processing of cash crops for Eu-
ropean markets.3 2 African workers received monetary incomes in return
for their labor,". which generated a demand for manufactured consumer
tian Sudan, Rhodesia and South Africa. Belgium claimed a vast portion of central Africa
known as the Belgian Congo. Portugal claimed Angola and Mozambique, while Germany
occupied the Cameroon, German East Africa and South West Africa. Spain claimed Rio de
Oro on the Atlantic Coast and Spanish Guinea. Italy acquired Eritrea and Somaliland in the
Horn of Africa. Duignan & Gann, The Pre-Colonial Economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, in 4
COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960, at 33, 65 (P. Duignan & L. Gann eds. 1975).
20 Amoa, supra note 19, at 27-28. Colonization benefitted merchants and investors who
enjoyed the captive markets. Investments were safe from confiscation with Europeans con-
trolling the banking and currency systems. Metropolitan powers benefitted from secure
sources of raw materials and a large share of the available African market. From 1950 to
1957, 67 percent of exports to French colonies originated in France. During the same period,
47 percent of the imports of British Africa came from Britain. Nevertheless, Europeans do-
ing business in Africa faced high costs for transportation, duties, handling and risk factors,
and therefore, derived no exhorbitant profits from their trade. Duignan & Gann, Economic
Achievements of the Colonizers: An Assessment, in 4 COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960, at
673, 679 (P. Duignan & L. Gann eds. 1975).
217 R. CORNEVIN, L'AFRIQUE NOIRE DE 1919 A NOS JOURs 23-30 (1973). Economic coercion
was applied in a number of ways. Coercive practices included the compulsory cultivation of
crops and the use of forced labor. Duignan & Gann, supra note 26, at 690.
28 H. WILSON, supra note 22, at 88-94. A number of African kingdoms resisted Euro-
pean occupation. The Ashanti, who defeated European forces in the early 19th century,
were finally overcome in 1901. The Zulu were defeated in 1879 and 1906. Guerilla leaders in
West Africa and the Sudan maintained independent forces until the turn of the century. In
all cases, the Europeans eventually prevailed, destroying the old powers. B. FETTER, COLO-
NIAL RULE IN AFRICA 7-8 (1979).
29 Duignan & Gann, supra note 26, at 690.
20 The African market of European goods was initially negligible. R. OLIVER & J. FAGE,
supra note 24, at 196-97. In the years following World War II, Africa gained importance as
an export market for Europe. See supra note 26.
"' Unlike the cultivation of cash crops, the development of mining in Southern Africa
required the introduction of advanced industrial technology. Deep mines were excavated,
while railway and automobiles replaced earlier methods of transportation. This technology
remained largely unassimilated by Africans, however. Davidson, Africa in Historical Per-
spective, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 44 (1979).
2 Elkan & Van Zaanenberg, How People Came to Live in Towns, in 4 COLONIALISM IN
AFRICA 1870-1960, at 655, 656 (P. Duignan & L. Gann eds. 1975).
'3 Skinner, The Persistence of Psychological and Structural Dependence After Coloni-
alism, in DECOLONIALIZATION AND DEPENDENCY 72 (A. Yansane ed. 1980).
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goods" that were not locally produced.3 5 Both colonial administration 36
and pressure from overseas suppliers anxious to retain their African mar-
kets tended to preclude industrial development in Africa.37 The local
economies' dependence on trade with Europe resulted in profound eco-
nomic3 8 and socialss change.
The exchange of raw materials and primary agricultural products for
goods manufactured in Europe continues to characterize a large part of
African trade.40 Most African states have economic structures based on
the export of a single or a small group of commodities, 4 and are depen-
dent upon purchasers in developed nations. European politicians still see
Africa as a source of raw materials and an outlet for finished products.
42
Elkan & Van Zaanenberg, supra note 32, at 656.
3U European governments were unwilling to impose tariffs, provide industrial training,
or deploy the capital considered necessary for industrial growth. Economic policies focused
on retrenchment, rather than foreign aid to combat slowed growth rates. Id.
3 Id.
37 Overseas trade opportunities provided the initial stimulus for development in most
African colonies, yet the sale of cash crops or wage labor led to highly uneven economic
growth. In economic terms, the absence of market information, high risks, insufficient mar-
ket opportunities, a lack of marketing facilities and coercive governmental practices ham-
pered development. Large sectors of Africa had a rural subsistence-based economy at the
end of the colonial period. Meier, External Trade and Internal Development, in 4 COLONi-
ALIsM N AFRICA 1870-1960, at 427, 465-66 (P. Duignan & L. Dunn eds. 1975). At the present
time, 85 percent of Africa's wealth is produced by 5 percent of its land area. Duignan &
Gann, supra note 26, at 693.
" See A. MABOGUNJE, THE DEvELoPmENT PROCESS 78-83 (1980); S. NEUMARK, FOREIGN
TRADE AND ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 165-87 (1964).
" See generally INTERNATIONAL AFRICAN INSTITUTE & UNESCO, SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA (1958); J. Gmns,
PEOPLES OF AFRICA (1965).
10 In 1977, for example, 86 percent of the EEC's exports to the ACP states were manu-
factured products, primarily machinery and transport equipment. Food products accounted
for ten percent of the EEC exports to the ACP, while raw materials comprised only one
percent of EEC exports.
During this same period, three main products--oil, coffee and cocoa-accounted for
over half of the EEC's imports from the ACP states. These along with seven other prod-
ucts--copper, timber, sugar, iron ore, groundnuts, aluminum and cotton-comprised 80 per-
cent of the EEC's imports from the ACP states. Manufactured products accounted for ony_
3.6 percent of EEC imports from the ACP. EUROSTAT, ANALYSE DES EkCHANGES ENTRE
COMMUNAUT EUROPPEN Er LES ETATS ACP §§ 2.12, 3.16 (1979).
41 The economies of ACP states often fluctuate with the price of a single raw material
or commodity in world markets. These fluctuations occur when a country exports a few raw
materials or commodities, the price of which may vary for reasons entirely beyond the ex-
porting state's control. Examples of ACP states with economies tied exclusively to a single
raw material are: Guinea, iron ore comprising 90 percent of exports; Chad, cotton compris-
ing 69 percent of exports; Mauritius, sugar comprising 93 percent of exports; and Zambia,
copper comprising 95 percent of exports. Lom6 Dossier, reprinted from THE COURIER, No.
31, at 41-43 (Mar. 1975) (special issue) [hereinafter cited as Lomg Dossier].
4The following internal communication was directed by the EEC Council to the EEC
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Since World War II, however, Europeans have increasingly sought
equitable grounds on which to justify their relationship with Africa."'
Africans themselves have rejected European domination of local institu-
tions and called for greater autonomy and independence in their dealings
with advanced nations.4 EEC trade agreements with Africa reflect an
awareness of Africa's economic weakness both in their aid provisions and
their stated objectives. 45 However, the extent to which the EEC will per-
mit significant alterations in the traditional pattern of Eurafrican trade
continues to be the subject of considerable controversy.46
III. THE AssoCIATION REGIME
A. Creation of the EEC and Association of European Colonies
In the early 1950's, Western European statesmen proposed the crea-
tion of an economic unit capable of competing with the United States. 47
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
subsequently agreed on a proposal for the merger of their economies into
Commission:
The Community has a vital interest in seeing its network of investments in
the developing countries expand at the same rate as those of its competitors in
trade, particularly the United States and Japan. It is therefore essential that a
large number of major investments be made in the various sectors of the develop-
ing countries' economies in order to: maintain and strengthen the presence of Eu-
ropean industry and trade on the markets of the developing countries... [and]
provide the Community with more secure and diverse supplies of raw materials,
etc.
EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE, EUROPE DocuMENTS, No.
985, at 2 (Feb. 2, 1978).
43 Sir Keith Hancock, a British advocate of enlightened colonial policy, emphasized the
need for "vigorous state action to promote colonial development and welfare." R. OLIVER &
J. FAGE, supra note 24, at 222. By 1945, Great Britain had decided that its African Com-
monwealth colonies should become independent. France, in contrast, formulated a policy of
reform rather than independence during this period. Legal reform, African participation in
the administratiave and political process and massive assistance programs were imple-
mented. H. WILSON, supra note 22, at 299-302. For a succinct account of the decolonization
of French and Equatorial Africa, see Crowder & O'Brien, French West Africa, 1945-1960, in
HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA (J. Ajanyi & M. Crowder eds. 1974).
44 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, led the movement for national indepen-
dence among the former British Commonwealth colonies. See K. NKRumAH, GHANA: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF KWAME NKRUMAH (1959). Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast
founded an interterritorial political party, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain,
which played a leading role in the politicization of the French territories. R. OLIVER & J.
FAGE, supra note 24, at 244.
45 See infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
46 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
47 R. BROAD & R. JARRETT, CoMMUNITY EUROPE: A SHORT GUIDE TO THE COMMON MAR-
KET 14-17 (1968).
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a single community.48 As a result, the Treaty of Rome was signed on
March 25, 1957, establishing the European Economic Community. 9
The six original members of the EEC were unable to agree, however,
on the relationship colonial territories should have to the EEC. France"
sought to integrate her colonies into the EEC.51 African colonies belong-
ing to the Franc area were integrated in a protected trading system inex-
tricably linked to French monetary and economic policy.52 Moreover, pro-
duction of certain agricultural products in French colonies outstripped
France's domestic demand.53 Accession of French colonies to the EEC
provided alternative markets in Europe for their products.5 Additionally,
France hoped for high tariff barriers to the importation of tropical prod-
ucts from states not associated with the EEC.55
Other EEC countries did not wish to see France's territorial posses-
sions included in the community. West Germany in particular opposed
the addition of French colonies to the EEC,5 6 anticipating that such an
arrangement would require the community's subsidization of French colo-
nial ventures in Africa and Indochina.57 The financial demands of the
overseas territories on the French treasury were considerable. France was
willing to open colonial markets to the other EEC countries, but anxious
to avoid sole responsibility for continued financing of the necessary
48 Id. at 23.
4, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
80 For an historical perspective on French interaction with black Africa from the 16th
century to the period of the "Scramble for Africa" (1879-1902), see W. COHEN, THE FRENCH
ENCOUNTER WITH AFRIcANs (1980). A detailed account of post-World War 11 French-African
political relations is contained in D. WHITE, BLACK AFRICA AND DEGAULLE (1979).
51 The EEC is a customs union. Products entering the EEC are subject to a uniform
tariff, while barriers to the movement of goods between Member States, signatories to the
Treaty of Rome, are progressively eliminated. The Treaty of Rome also provides for the free
movement of persons, services and capital between Member States. Treaty of Rome, supra
note 49, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15-16 (art. 36(a-b)); at 21-24 (arts. 15-22); at 26-30 (arts. 30-37); at
36-44 (arts. 48-73). See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrIES (1972).
52 L ZARTMAN, THE PoLrmcs OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE EuRo-
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 6 (1971). For a discussion of the Franc Area and its tendency to
concentrate African production on a limited number of products, see van Benthem van den
Bergh, The New Convention of Association with African States, 1 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
156, 156-158 (1963).
" van Benthem van den Bergh, supra note 52, at 158. Coffee, cocoa, cotton and
groundnuts (peanuts) were being produced in large quantities by Senegal, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, the Ivory Coast, Chad, the Cameroons and Madagascar. Id. at 157 n.1.
84 I. ZARTMAN, supra note 52, at 8.
55 Id. at 10; van Benthem van den Bergh, supra note 52, at 158.
" P. OKIGBO, AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET 26 (1967).
57 Amoa, supra note 19, at 29.
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infrastructure."s
Outright inclusion of France's overseas territories in the EEC would
have raised major technical problems.5 9 Moreover, Germany and the
Netherlands, and possibly others within the six original members of the
EEC, would have rejected such a proposal.6 0 However, France was unwill-
ing to see her dependencies excluded from the community. By advocating
a compromise plan of "association" between the EEC and France's over-
seas territories, French negotiators achieved their primary objectives.6 '
B. The Reverse Preference: Association at a Price
In exchange for financial assistance and other advantages, France,
and to a lesser extent Italy and Belgium, agreed to share formerly captive
markets with their European partners.6 2 The compromise plan of associa-
tion extended the EEC customs union to include colonial territories (As-
sociated States) on an individual basis.6 3 Goods originating in Associated
States were to be admitted into the EEC's Member States duty free."
Associated States reciprocated by undertaking the progressive elimina-
tion of "duties and charges" on imports originating in Member States.65
The plan prohibited Associated States from discriminating in favor of the
-van Benthem van den Bergh, supra note 52, at 159. France argued that it was unable
to renovate its aging industrial base to meet German competition while bearing alone the
cost of African development. Without basic facilities, equipment, services and installations,
France's colonies would have been of little value. Id.
'" C. COSGRovE-TwITcHEiT, EUROPE AND AFRICA: FROM ASSOCIATION TO PARTNERSHIP 9
(1978). The Treaty of Rome was drafted to incorporate a small number of geographically
contiguous, economically advanced countries. To incorporate France's colonies outright,
countless derogations, exceptions and safeguard clauses would have been required. Id. at 9-
10.
60 L ZARTmAN, supra note 52, at 7; van Benthem van den Bergh, supra note 52, at 159.
61 van Benthem van den Bergh, supra note 52, at 159. France provided its territories
with access to the EEC market of 170 million people, while acquiring partners in the costly
undertaking of developing African infra-structures. C. CosGRovE-TwrrcHarr, supra note 59,
at 10. The association of overseas territories is only one of a series of provisions which were
included in the Treaty of Rome at the insistence of France. Along with the association,
France also demanded that the treaty contain safeguard provisions for its balance of pay-
ments. These provisions were for use in response to problems arising from trade between
the Member States. Id. at 7-11. France's negotiating strategy is discussed in L ZARTMAN,
supra note 52.
62 J. MATrHEws, ASSOCIATION SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrY 13 (1977).
" P. OKIGBO, supra note 56, at 26.
4While the economies of the Member States were to be integrated, the 18 Associated
States remained as separate, isolated markets. Combined, the ASsociated States had a
smaller population than West Germany, and a smaller national income than Belgium. Ar-
guably, the isolation and weakness of their individual economies made them captive markets
for the European nations under association. Id. at 27-28.
65 G. VEsrr, TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (1969).
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European state with which they had "special relations. 66
The requirement that Associated States reduce the duties charged on
imports from the EEC has been termed a "reverse preference." This
system furthers a division of labor in which African states specialize in
the production of tropical agricultural products and raw materials. The
EEC in turn provides industrial products and processed goods.6 8 Reci-
procity in this context has been criticized because it hinders the growth of
industry in developing countries.69 Without the flexibility to impose tar-
iffs on imported goods, developing countries are unable to shield growing
domestic industries from competition against stronger, established con-
cerns based in developed countries.70 Under this arrangement, exports to
the EEC from non-associated developing countries actually increased
more than those of Associated States.71 There is no evidence that the
preferences granted to the Associated States had a beneficial effect on
their trade with the EEC.
C. African Independence and the Yaound6 Agreements
The advantages the Associated States derived, as well as the obliga-
tions they incurred, were arranged by the colonial powers.7 2 The relative
status of the parties suggests a trusteeship.73 With the movement towards
M Treaty of Rome, supra note 49, 298 U.N.T.S. at 65-66 (art. 132(1-3)).
67 See, e.g., R. BAILEY, THE EUoPEAN COMMUNITY AND TIE WORLD 35 (1973); Gruhn,
The Lomg Convention: Inching Towards Interdependence, 30 INr'L ORGANIZATION 241, 246
(1976). The Treaty of Rome permits Associated States to "levy customs duties which corre-
spond to the needs of their development and .. .industrialization or which... have the
object of contributing to their budgets." Treaty of Rome, supra note 49, 298 U.N.T.S. at 66
(art. 133(3)). Discrimination between Member States is prohibited. The Associated State is
required to apply the same rate of duty to the country with which it had special relations as
it applies to all Member States. Id. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
" BAILEY, supra note 67, at 35; P. OKIGO, supra note 56, at 27.
,P. OKIGBO, supra note 56, at 56. A 1964 U.N. Conference addressed this problem.
UNTED NATIONS, REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS A NEw TRADE POLICY FOR DEvELOPMENT, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF. 46/3, at 32-34 (1964). See also Pinder, The Community and Developing Coun-
tries: Associates and Outsiders, 12 J. COMMON MKT. STuD. 53, 59 (1973).
70 Association prevented the Associated States from using export duties to encourage
local processing of exportable raw materials. Selective application of export duties makes
domestically produced products more attractive than similar European products. P. OIUGBO,
supra note 56, at 55-56.
71 van Benthem van den Bergh, supra note 52, at 161 n.10. EEC imports from the
Associated States increased from $915 million in 1958 to $989 million in 1963; imports from
non-associated developing African countries went from $979 million in 1958 to $1,699 mil-
lion in 1963. C. COSGRovE-TwrrcHL.T, supra note 59, at 61.
72 C. COSGROvE-TwrrcHLsr, supra note 59, at 21; P. OKIGBO, supra note 56, at 26.
7 3Rivkin, Africa and the EEC: New Inter-Regional Association, 2 J. L. & ECON. DEv.
56 (1967).
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independence in the late 1950's, the legal relations of the EEC and its
former colonies took on a different character.
Between 1958 and 1962, eighteen sovereign nations were created
from formerly dependent territories.74 A number of the new African
states formally requested that the association regime be continued.7 5 Ne-
gotiations between representatives of the EEC and the Associated States
began as early as 1961.76 As a result, Yaound6 I was signed in July 1963 at
Yaound6, Cameroon and came into force in January 1964. 7
Yaound6 I expired in 1969, and a subsequent agreement, Yaound6 II,
was negotiated and ratified in the same year, remaining in effect until
1975.8 The enthusiasm displayed by African states for continued associa-
tion with the EEC is primarily attributable to the financial aid granted
under both Yaound6 I and II. 9
Trade provisions under both agreements largely resembled those es-
tablished by the Treaty of Rome.80 Discrimination against or between the
EEC's Member States was prohibited."' Associated States were given
duty-free access to the EEC for a limited number of primary products
only.' The reverse preference system described above remained substan-
" The new nations created were Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauri-
tania, Niger, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Madagas-
car, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia. P. OKIGBO,
supra note 56, at 45.
" The states requesting that association continue were Toga, Ivory Coast, the Central
African Republic, Congo (Brazzavile), Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Chad and Upper Volta. P.
OKiGBO, supra note 56, at 45.
76 C. COSGRovE-Twrrcrr, supra note 59, at 73.
"' Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and the Af-
rican and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, July 20, 1963, reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 971 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Yaound6 I]. All the newly-formed states, supra note
74, excepting Guinea, as well as Togo joined the Association of African and Malagasy States.
J. MATrHsws, supra note 62, at 14, 15.
"' Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and the Af-
rican and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, July 29, 1969, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 484 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Yaound6 I1]. In 1972, Mauritius joined the Associ-
ated States. J. MAT'rmws, supra note 62, at 18.
7' The European Development Fund (EDF) was created to administer EEC aid to the
Associated States. From 1964 to 1969, the EDF's resources totaled $750 million. EDF re-
sources for the next five years increased to $918 million. J. MATTHEws, supra note 62, at 17.
For some of the poorest Associated States, the EDF accounted for 30 percent of total exter-
nal aid received. Gruhn, supra note 67, at 247.
80 C. CosoRova-TwrrcHEr, supra note 59, at 99, 118.
11 Gruhn, supra note 67, at 246.
8 Products granted duty-free access under Yaound6 I were: fresh pineapples, desic-
cated coconut, unroasted coffee, tea, uncrushed pepper, vanilla, cloves (not crushed or
ground), nutmegs (not crushed or ground) and cocoa beans. All other imports from the As-
sociated States were subject to the same rate of duty applied among Member States. P.
OKGBO, supra note 56, at 49-50.
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tially unchanged. 3
Both Associated States and the EEC's Member States were granted
separate safeguard powers by the Yaound6 Conventions." No evidence
indicates the EEC ever invoked the clause.85 The export performance of
the Associated States posed no threat to the EEC economies. EEC im-
ports from the Associated States, as a percentage of total EEC imports
from developing countries, declined from 13.4% in 1958 to 7.4% in
1974.86 Moreover, EEC exports to Associated States, as a percentage of
total EEC exports to developing countries, declined from 11.6% in 1958
to 9.9% in 1973.87 Thus, EEC trade with the Associated States retained
its initial character throughout the period of association. The Treaty of
Rome and the Yaound6 conventions apparently had little effect on the
traditional pattern of Europe's trade with Africa.s8
IV. THE Lomb CONVENTIONS
A. Lomg I
1. The ACP-EEC Partnership
Yaound6 I's successor, the First Lom6 Convention (Lom6 1),81 was
negotiated under circumstances more advantageous to the developing
countries. The accession of the United Kingdom to the European Eco-
nomic Community in 197390 ensured the participation of African and Car-
83 Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 820-22.
'4 The safeguard clause available to the EEC under Yaound6 I permits action: "If seri-
ous disturbances occur in one sector of the economy of the Community or of one or more
Member States, or jeopardize their external financial stability, and if difficulties arise which
may result in a region suffering grave economic hardship ..... Yaound6 I, supra note 77, 2
LL.M. at 977 (art. 13(2)) (emphasis added).
Under Yaound6 II, the EEC is permitted to act: "If serious disturbances occur in a
sector of the economy of the Communi ty or of one or more of its Member States, or jeopard-
ize their external financial stability, or if difficulties arise which result in a deterioration in
the economic situation of a region in the Community ... ." Yaound6 II, supra note 78, 9
LL.M. at 487-88 (art. 16(2)) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the broader safeguard
powers available to the Associated States, see P. OKIGBO, supra note 56, at 52-54 (conclud-
ing that the inherent limitations of the clause unduly interfered with the ability of Associ-
ated States to make use of it).
85 Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 844.
8 J. MATrHEws, supra note 62, at 46 (table 5).
87 Id.
8 Gruhn, supra note 67, at 246.
8 Lom6 I, supra note 1.
80 The EEC enactment through which Great Britain acceded to the EEC is formally
known as: An Act to make provision in connection with the enlargement of the European
Communities to include the United Kingdom, together with (for certain purposes) the
Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and Gibralter. 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 117012 (1973).
See D. WALL, EuRoPEA CozmuNrrms Acr 15 (1973).
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ibbean Commonwealth countries in the negotiations.9 The ACP states
negotiated as a bloc to increase their bargaining power.9 2 Developing na-
tions were pressuring the U.N. General Assembly to address problems of
uneven development and allocation of world resources.93
While Lom6 I negotiations were underway, the EEC was negotiating
multilateral trade agreements within the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).9 The EEC was also participating in the reform of
the international monetary system under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.9 5 The common theme in these negotiations was
the establishment of a more equitable allocation of resources in the world
economy.98 Moreover, the dependency of the industrial states on the less
developed countries became readily apparent during the first oil crisis.97
91 Dodoo & Kusten, The Road to Lomb, in THE Lomg CONVENTION AND A NEW INTERNA-
TioNAL ECONOMIC ORDER 30-31 (F. Alting von Gesau ed. 1977).
92 Gruhn, supra note 67, at 247-48. Several factors explain the unity of ACP states in
the negotiations: (1) ACP states considered a unified approach the only successful negotiat-
ing technique towards the EEC; (2) ACP states had common interests in the negotiations;
(3) Nigeria's participation represented a powerful catalyzing force; and, (4) ACP states gen-
erally felt greater potential economic and political power. Dodoo & Kusten, supra note 91,
at 34. On growing African unity in trade negotiations, see generally I. ZARTMAN, supra note
52, at 23.
' The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, generally known as the New Economic Order, on Dec. 12, 1974. G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See generally Haight, The New
International Economic Order and the Charter of Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L
LAW. 591 (1975).
" The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature, Oct.
30, 1974, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, is a multilateral trade agreement
providing a schedule of tariff commitments, common rules of trade and an organization to
promote negotiations, settle disputes and administer the agreement's provisions. The basic
principles of GATT require members to generalize preferences on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis, protect domestic industries through customs tariffs rather than non-tariff barriers, and
consult with each other prior to modifying their external commercial policies. P. LoERTIE,
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE LAW OF GATT 1 (1975).
"I The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods
Conference. The IMF possesses broad powers to guide the international financial conduct of
its members. The Fund's purpose is to monitor currency exchange rates, administer a code
of "fair practice" in the field of foreign exchange rates and international financial transac-
tions and provide financial resources to countries needing assistance in dealing with pay-
ment imbalances. Southard, The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund, 5 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 425, 426 (1980). The abandonment of the gold standard by the United
States and the adoption of floating rates by the world's major industrial countries in the
early 1970's required a major reappraisal of international fiscal relations. Id. at 460-68.
" Simmonds, The Lom6 Convention and the New International Economic Order, 13
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315, 319 (1976).
" From 1970 to 1974, members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) obtained a 478.7% increase in the posted price of crude petroleum. In 1974, oil
exporting countries had a $70 billion trade surplus, while non oil-producing developing
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The enhanced bargaining power of the ACP states is reflected in
terms of the new agreement. Article I of Lom6 I emphasized the increased
concern for trade growth in the ACP states.98 Accordingly, under Lom6 I,
the EEC no longer required the granting of reverse preferences as it had
under association.99 Elimination of the reverse preference requirement is
considered to be in recognition of the preexisting inequalities in the EEC-
ACP trade relationship. 100
2. Improved Market Access Subject to Rules of Origin and Safe-
guard Provisions
Lom6 I provided the ACP states with better access to EEC markets
than African exporters had enjoyed under association. An estimated
99.2% of the value of ACP exports to the EEC was given duty-free access
under Lom6 I, free from quotas or other quantitative restrictions.10 1 A
further advantage was that the EEC agreed to treat the ACP states as a
single customs area in applying the "rules of origin. °1 0 2
countries saw their deficit increase from $6 billion in 1973 to $28 billion in 1974. To counter-
act this deficit and secure allies in their confrontation with developed nations, OPEC coun-
tries responded with aid programs to developing nations. In turn, developed nations in-
creased their own assistance to developing nations. Hudes, Towards a New International
Economic Order, 1 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 87, 99-101 (1975). The successful for-
mation of OPEC, and the "energy crisis" are viewed by some writers as the crucial elements
creating a turning point in relations between industrially developed nations and poor devel-
oping nations. See Coppens, Faber & Lof, European Community's Security of Supply with
Raw Materials and the Interests of Developing Countries: The Need for a Cooperative
Strategy, in THE Loii, CONVENTION AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOWsC ORDER 161 (F.
Alting von Gesau ed. 1977).
*" See supra note 14.
"Lom6 I, supra note 1, 14 LL.M. at 608 (art. 7(1)). A primary factor in the acquies-
cence of the EEC to the elimination of the reverse preference demand was the United States
opposition. Under the Generalized System of Preferences, the U.S. President has the au-
thority to extend duty-free treatment to developing countries on a broad range of articles.
19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982). The President may revoke such treatment if "such country affords
preferential treatment to the products of a developed country, other than the United States
... unless the President has received assurances satisfactory to him that such preferential
treatment will be eliminated before January 1, 1976." Id. § 2462(b).
100 C. COSGROVE-TwrrcHETr, supra note 59, at 150; GRUHN, supra note 67, at 255;
Laing, New Departures in Multilateral Trade, Development and Cooperation: The Lomg
Convention and Its Impact on the United States, 26 MERCER L. REV. 781, 798 (1976); SiM-
MONDs, supra note 96, at 324; see R. Bally, supra note 67, at 35. For a view that the elimina-
tion of reverse preferences will be of little benefit to the ACP states, see Dolan, The Lomr
Convention and Europe's Relationship with the Third World: A Critical Analysis, 1 Revue
d'Intkgration Europienne 369, 392 (1978).
101 Lom6 Dossier, supra note 41, at 23. This estimate excludes sugar, which is sepa-
rately considered. Under the Association, only raw materials and primary products were
given duty-free access. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
102 Lom6 I, supra note 1, 14 I.L.M. AT 623 (PROTOCOL No. 1, ART. 1(2)).
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The rules of origin are a complex set of requirements incorporated in
Lom6 I to ensure that products granted duty-free treatment actually orig-
inate in one of the ACP states. All products jointly produced in a number
of ACP states receive originating status. The EEC refuses to extend this
principle to third party developing nations.103 All non-originating prod-
ucts processed in ACP states receive duty free treatment only if 50% of
the product's export value is added in the ACP state.104 The rules of ori-
gin are designed to prevent Japanese or U.S. exporters from using the
ACP states as a front for duty-free penetration of the EEC market.10 5
The EEC's fear of regional economic harm within the community is
reflected in the Lom6 safeguard provision. EEC negotiators may have an-
ticipated such harm from Lom6 I's liberalized market access provisions.
Under article 10, protective measures are authorized under the following
circumstances:
[If, as a result of applying the provisions of this Chapter, serious distur-
bances occur in a sector of the economy of the Community or of one or
more of its Member States, or jeopardize their external financial stabil-
ity, or if difficulties arise which may result in a deterioration in a sector
of the economy of a region of the Community .... lo6
Yaound6 I permitted protective measures when the threat of a region suf-
fering "grave economic hardship" existed. 0 7 Yaound6 II required a "dete-
rioration in the economic situation" of a region. 08
Under Lom6 I, however, protective measures may be taken in antici-
pation of a "deterioration in a sector" of a region's economy.'09 In ex-
change for concessions in other areas, ACP negotiators have granted the
EEC broad discretion in determining when the application of safeguard
measures is justified. Without the requirement that threatened harm be
of grave proportions, or that deterioration in the region's economy actu-
ally occur, there is greater opportunity for unilateral action by the EEC.
B. Lom6 II 1
Lom6 I expired on March 1, 1980. A renegotiated agreement (Lom6
103 Dodoo & Kusten, supra note 91, at 43.
101 The ACP suggested that 25 percent of added value should confer originating status.
The EEC insisted on 50 percent fearing that a lower percentage would-permit third party
exporters merely to package goods in ACP states, adding 25 percent to value and obtaining
duty-free treatment. Id. See generally Nusbaurner, Origin Systems and the Trade of Devel-
oping Countries, 13 J. World Trade L. 34 (1979).
"I Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 842.
100 Lom6 I, supra note 1, 14 LL.M. AT 608 (ART. 10).
"I7 See supra note 84.
108 Id.
'" Lom6 I, supra note 1, 14 LL.M. AT 608 (ART. 10).
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I1)110 took effect immediately. Lom6 II was negotiated in a different inter-
national climate from its predecessor. The results of the U.N Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) V' 1' in Manila were not satisfac-
tory to the developing nations.1 2 GATT negotiations in Tokyo over the
use of protectionist measures were deadlocked.', Confronted with their
own internal economic problems, EEC officials were unlikely to concede
to ACP demands for a significant revision of Lom6 1.114 Instead, ACP
negotiators were reminded of their unique position as beneficiaries of the
EEC.115
The EEC approach to Lom6 II negotiations was formally stated at
the opening session in July 1978. "The convention has proved itself in
practice. The renegotiations will therefore not deal with sweeping changes
or renovation but with adjustments and improvements."116 Accordingly,
the trade provisions of Lom6 11 reproduce the provisions of Lom6 I with
only minor alterations. 17 The safeguard provisions and the rules of origin
remain largely unchanged.118
110 See supra note 1.
"I The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), first con-
vened in 1964, is now a permanent organ of the U.N. General Assembly. The Conference
formulates principles and policies for the promotion of trade, including the initiation of
multilateral pacts designed to harmonize government policies in the area of international
commerce. G.A. Res. 1994, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 1, U.N. Doc. A15815 (1965).
112 See Joekes & Kirkpatrick, The Results of UNCTAD V, 13 J. World Trade L. 535
(1979).
11 Noge, A Legal Guide to the Tokyo Round, 13 J. World Trade L. 436, 437 (1979).
114 Kirkpatrick, Lom II, 14 J. World Trade L. 352 (1980). EEC OFFICIALS APPROACHED
THE CONVENTION WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF IMPROVING ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS AND OBTAINING
GUARANTEES ON ITS INvESTTMENTs IN THE ACP STATES. Id.
Rainford, Ranimer L'Esprit de Partnership, Le Courrier, No. 58, AT 25 (Nov. 1979).
11 The Courier, No. 51, AT I (SEPT./OCT. 1978).
117 Kirkpatrick, supra note 114, at 353, 359; Simmonds, The Second Loing Convention:
The Innovative Features, 17 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 415, 418 (1980). CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS, NOT COVERED BY Los. I, WERE INCLUDED IN THE EEC's COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY THUS BENEFITTING FROM REDUCED IMPORT DUTIES. BEEF EXPORT QUOTAS, PREVIOUSLY
NEGOTIATED ON A YEARLY BASIS ARE NOW FIXED FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. YELPAALA, supra note
16, at 827.
118 For the full text of the Lom6 II safeguard clause, see supra note 9. Provisions 12(2)
and 12(4) were added in response to widespread concern over increased protectionism, and
the possible effect such protectionism could have on the developing economies of the ACP
states. See Helleiner, Lom&: Market Access and Industrial Cooperation, 13 J. World Trade
L. 181, 182-86 (1979). ANTICIPATING THE Lobi. H1 NEGOTIATIONS, HELLEINER SUGGESTS A NAR-
ROW DEFINITION OF THE Losf II SAFEGUARD CLAUSES SO THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ITS USE
ARE PREDICTABLE. ALSO, "VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS" OBTAINED FROM DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES ARE OFTEN USED IN LIEU OF SAFEGUARDS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EEC MAY IMPLIEDLY
THREATEN MORE RESTRICTIVE ACTION IF VOLUNTARY MEASURES ARE NOT ADOPTED. Id. at 182-83.
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V. THE LOMA CONVENTIONS AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE ACP
STATES
A. Static Trade Performance of the ACP States Under Lomg I
The ACP states generally desire to improve their ability to produce
semi-processed and manufactured goods for export. 119 Improved capacity
to process raw materials into manufactured goods has long been identi-
fied as fundamental to increasing the prosperity of the world's poorest
countries. 20 Both Lom6 I and Lom6 II explicitly recognize "the need to
secure additional benefits for the trade of the ACP States. 112 Thus, one
measure of the success of the conventions is the effect of the market ac-
cess provisions on the industrial development of the ACP states.
The trade performance of the ACP states in the Lom6 years, how-
ever, is disappointing. The pattern of trade between the ACP states and
the EEC remained essentially unchanged in the period in which Lom6 I
was in effect. 22 In the same period, the share of the total EEC imports
from non-oil exporting ACP states declined sharply123 while the composi-
tion of the ACP states' exports to the EEC remained largely un-
changed.'24 Although the preferential access granted under Lom6 I was
presented by the EEC as a major development instrument, 25 the impact
of the agreement on the ACP-EEC trade relationship has been described
as "negligible.' 126
B. External Factors Reduce the Value of Lom6 Preferences
Two factors extrinsic to the conventions reduce the benefits to the
12 Moss & Ravenhill, Trade Developments During the First Lom Convention, 10
World Dev. 841, 850 (1982). See Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 833 n.155.
120 See P. Okigbo, supra note 56, at 56. See, e.g., United Nations Converence on Trade
and Development, Incentives for Industrial Exports, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/184, AT 1 (1982).
121 See supra note 14.
'22 Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 845.
"I Id. at 847-48 (table 8).
124 Id. at 849. See supra notes 20 and 40.
22 On Feb. 28, 1975, at Lom6, Togo, Francois-Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities spoke in the following terms:
The importance and the originality of the Lom6 Convention derive not only
from the particular conditions in which it has been negotiated but also, perhaps
especially, from its contents....
Although financial aid remains necessary, and even fundamental, for a certain
number of particularly poor countries, it cannot remain the only method of devel-
opment cooperation. That is why we wanted to open the European market to
products from the ACP States and give them access to our know-how and technol-
ogy in a framework of intensive industrial cooperation.
Lom6 Dossier, supra note 41, at 20.
12' Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 849.
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ACP states of duty free access to the EEC."' The first factor is the reduc-
tion in the EEC's Common External Tariff,28 which was obtained
through a series of GATT1 29 multilateral negotiations. By lowering the
Common External Tariff, the advantage conferred upon the ACP states
by the convention is diminished. 80 The second factor is the deployment
of the EEC's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),131 which extends
preferential treatment to all developing countries on a nonreciprocal ba-
sis. 132 The GSP imposes greater restrictions ss than the Lom6 agreements
on producers in developing countries, but nevertheless erodes the value of
the preferences granted to the ACP states.1 '
C. Intrinsic Barriers to Development
1. Miscellaneous Shortcomings: Rules of Origin and Shipping Rates
In addition to the extrinsic factors which reduce the value of the
Lom6 trade preferences, a variety of factors intrinsic to Lom6 II interfere
with industrial development. The rules of origin, in particular, may pro-
tect manufactures in the EEC by requiring a higher percentage of added
value than is necessary to avoid trade deflection.135 Moreover, Lom6 H
shipping rules appear to favor the export of raw materials over processed
"1 Id. at 841.
'" The Common External Tariff is the duty imposed by the EEC on all imports
originating outside the EEC. Treaty of Rome, supra note 49, 298 U.N.T.S. at 22-26 (arts.
18-29). See also P. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Community Law 52 (2D FD. 1975).
11 See supra note 94.
180 Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 841.
13 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was developed through UNCTAD,
supra note 111, to meet the trade needs of developing countries. Under the GSP, developing
countries agree to offer non-reciprocal, general tariff reductions on the manufactured and
semi-manufactured imports of developing countries. Behnam, Development and Structure
of the Generalized System of Preferences, 9 J. World Trade L. 442, 443 (1975); see also
supra note 99.
' Weston, How Sensitive is the EEC's Generalised System of Preferences?, [1980] 1
ODI Review A Journal of Development Policy 11, 12.
18 Under the GSP, quotas are imposed on imports of "sensitive" products. As a result,
individual developing countries are subject to "ceilings" limiting the value of exports
granted preferential treatment. DeBouter, Tariff Preferences Revisited, 11 J. Int'l L. &
Econ. 353, 371 N.80 (1977). See generally Weston, supra note 132 (arguing that tariff quotas
require exporters in developing countries to incur additional storage costs and customs
delay).
18 Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 841.
135 Helleiner, supra note 118, at 183-84. Helleiner finds the rules of origin "at present
hopelessly complex and unnecessarily restrictive." Id. See also McQueen, supra note 11;
Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 842 (given low levels of per capita income in ACP
states, rules of origin impose "particularly onerous requirement"); Yelpaala, supra note 16,
at 842 (future success of ACP states exporting manufactured goods depends in part on
liberalization of rules of origin).
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goods. 186 In some sectors, freight rates themselves discourage ACP
processing of raw materials. 13 7 The EEC could presumably exercise its in-
fluence to obtain more efficient rate setting systems. 38
2. Economic Structure of ACP States as a Barrier to Increased
Manufactured Exports
Overall, the greatest obstacle to effective use of the Lom6 market ac-
cess provisions is the economic structure of the ACP states. Unless sub-
stantial structural transformations are achieved through increased invest-
ments in plants and equipment, ACP producers will remain unable to
penetrate EEC markets. 39 The experience of the Associated States under
the Yaound6 conventions demonstrates that trade preferences standing
alone will not foster industrial development. 40 Although Lom6 I and HI
offer some advantages, the conditions of access offered to major ACP ex-
porters remain basically the same as under association. 141 The inability of
ACP states to increase their share of manufactured exports should there-
fore come as no surprise.
3. The Lom6 Safeguard Clause
To exploit the trade preferences granted under the Lom6 convention,
the ACP states must attract foreign investment or induce efficient domes-
tic investment in manufacturing sectors. 142 The safeguard powers retained
by the EEC throughout the Yaound6 and Lom6 regimes permit unilateral
suspension of preferential access in the event of anticipated harm to EEC
McQueen, supra note 11, at 130; Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 833-42. See generally
Belassa, The "New Protectionism" and the International Economy, 12 J. World Trade L.
409, 420 (1978) (EEC .CoT~iSSIN HAS MOVED TO PROTECT DOMESTIC SHIPBUILDING
:" elleiner, supra note 118, at 184.
The structure of freight rates is escalated in many sectors, just as EEC tariffs
against the ACP countries used to be, so as to generate higher levels of effective
protection for EEC processing the higher the stage of fabrication. These differen-
tiated rates are not obviously the product of rational efficiency-motivated rate-
setting systems and they constitute a serious impediment to the development of
raw material processing for export.
Id. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Processing Before
Export of Primary Commodities: Areas for Further International Cooperation, U.N. Doc.
TD/229/Supp. 2, AT 58-59 (MAR. 28, 1979).
"I Helleiner, supra note 118, at 184-85.
119 Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 839.
140 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
141 Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 842.
142 Yelpaala, Costs and Benefits from Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Ghana, 2
N.Y.U. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 72, 91-92 (1980).
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economies." The safeguard clause deprives planners in ACP states of the
assurance that EEC markets will provide a duty-free outlet for increased
production capacity.144 Moreover, with preferential access subject to uni-
lateral suspension, ACP states are less attractive to non-EEC, foreign di-
rect investors 4 5 The safeguard clause interferes with industrial develop-
ment planning and undermines the bargaining position of ACP state
governments which must negotiate the terms under which third party di-
rect investors will operate. The safeguard clause therefore injects an ele-
ment of uncertainty in the ACP-EEC relationship which is most harmful
to industrial growth of the ACP states.
The safeguard clause need not be formally invoked to be effective.
The EEC's unilateral power to invoke the clause is sufficient to interfere
with the ability of ACP states to plan for their industrial development.
By threatening use of the clause, the EEC can obtain the ACP states
commitment to "voluntarily" limit exports of sensitive products."4 That
such a commitment may be obtained without formally invoking the safe-
guard clause was demonstrated in 1979 when the EEC acted to limit ex-
ports of textiles from the Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Mauritius. 4 7 If
the Lom6 goal of "secur[ing] additional benefits for the trade of ACP
States""'  is to be realized, the conditions under which the safeguard
clause may directly or indirectly come into play must be sharply
defined. 1
49
VI. ENSURING ACCESS: RESTRUCTURING THE SAFEGUARD CLAUSE
A. Proposed Modification
Under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement,'5 the EEC sets overall import
143 Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 816-27.
14 See Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 842; Yelpaala, supra note 16, at 844.
15 On access to EEC markets as an important element in inducing foreign investment
in ACP states, see McQueen, supra note 11, at 128.
14 Helleiner, supra note 118, at 183.
"4 McQueen, supra note 11, at 120; Moss & Ravenhill, supra note 119, at 842; United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Trends, Developments and Re-
strictions in Trade in Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures, Including Areas of Special In-
terest to Developing Countries, and of Developments Arising From the Implementation of
thpeResMhofTXt'- WultateaL.Trade Negotiations, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/215, AT 41 (FEB.
18, 1983) [HtiimNAFrER CITED As-UNCTAD, Review of Trends].
See siupra.notes.44ind 121 and accompanying text.
149 See Helleiner, supra note 118, at 182-83 (firm rules governing use of safeguard
clauses and "voluntary" export restraints should be established); Yelpaala, supra note 16, at
844 (lack of firm criteria governing use of safeguard clause permits EEC to invoke at will,
since justification for use not required).
15 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and
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levels for textiles and clothes from the ACP states, known as the "ACP
line."'151 The ACP line establishes the import levels which the EEC would
consider necessary for applying the Lom6 II safeguard clause.1 2 The
terms of Lom6 II give no indication that the export privileges of the ACP
states are subject to quantitative restriction. In practice, however, the
EEC does impose such restrictions where imports of "sensitive prod-
ucts' 53 are concerned.
ACP states should encourage the EEC to extend the principle of the
ACP line to all imports from ACP states. ACP representatives should
participate in establishing a ceiling above which safeguard measures could
be applied. In the event that the EEC takes protective measures before
the ACP line has been surpassed, the ACP producer should be compen-
sated for resulting losses.'5 ' The proposed arrangement should only be
applied to ACP states with producers who currently possess significant
export capacities. When the EEC admits imports from the "least devel-
oped" 55 ACP states, safeguard measures should be unavailable.
B. Guaranteed Access for ACP States
1. Least Developed Countries
Under the proposed safeguard system, the least developed ACP
states would enjoy an unqualified privilege of duty-free access to EEC
markets. Producers in the least developed ACP states would nevertheless
remain subject to the rules of origin'56 which ensure significant processing
in the ACP state.15 7
Application of safeguard measures by the EEC would entitle the
least developed ACP state to compensation. Such an arrangement would
provide the least developed ACP states with an effective guarantee of ac-
cess to markets in the EEC. As a result, the state's bargaining position
relative -to third party direct investors would be significantly improved
and the process of planning for industrial development facilitated.
Selected Documents (21ST Supp. 1975).
I' UNCTAD, Review of Trends, supra note 147, at 41.
152 Id.
See supra note 133.
See Helleiner, supra note 118, at 182-83 (when one party ceases to afford to another
privileges enshrined in agreement, compensation should be offered for losses resulting
therefrom).
155 See supra note 2.
15 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
157 Id.
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2. Other ACP States
ACP states not defined as least developed would also enjoy guaran-
teed access to EEC markets under the proposed extension of the ACP
line. Once established, an industry specific ACP line would encourage ex-
ploitation of the trade preferences without apprehension of sudden appli-
cation of safeguard measures. As in the case of the least developed coun-
tries, the remaining ACP states would be subject to the rules of origin to
prevent abuse.
C. Retained Safeguard Powers of the EEC
The proposed safeguard system does not divest the EEC of the power
to safeguard local industries from sudden disturbances caused by compe-
tition. Least developed countries are unlikely to develop export capacity
capable of harming EEC industries within the five year term.15 Should a
country develop such a capacity, appropriate measures could be taken
when the agreement is renegotiated.
ACP states not defined as least developed would be subject to the
ACP lines governing various industries. The EEC's power to set an ac-
ceptable level of imports would obviate the need for protectionist action
until that level had been surpassed. Imports in excess of the acceptable
level would then, at the EEC's discretion, be subject to safeguard action.
VII. TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP
A. The Lomg Record: Conflicting Assessments
Scholars disagree on the value of the Lom6 conventions to the ACP
states. Several writers view the conventions as significant steps toward a
true ACP-EEC partnership. 159 Critics of the Lom6 relationship see Lom6
I and II as neo-colonial instruments designed to perpetuate a trade sys-
"' Yelpaala, supra note 142, at 842.
'59 C. Cosgrove-Twitchett, supra note 59, at 164, 168. Tracing EEC-ACP trade relations
from the period immediately preceding the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the period
following the signing of Lom6 I, this author concludes that "[Lom6 I] represents a signifi-
cant advance over the Yaound6 regime, particularly in terms of access to the EEC market."
Id. at 167. The author believes that "all the ACP governments would refute . . . allegations
of neo-colonialism." Id. at 168.
Another writer states:
Economic rewards... may fall short of optimistic estimates .... Yet it would
appear that organized, skilled, and firm political and technical pressure did allow
weak states to apply pressure on strong states with considerable gains .... A
combination of the urgency of the issues under negotiation and of leadership skill
minimized systemic constraints.
Gruhn, supra note 67, at 261.
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tern which has benefitted European interests at the expense of African
economic progress.160 Both views undoubtedly contain substantial ele-
ments of truth.
Even those who are sharply critical of the Lom6 system recognize
that many individuals acting on behalf of the EEC are genuinely con-
cerned with the development of the ACP states.161 Moreover, commenta-
tors who favor the Lom6 system recognize that inequitable features still
characterize the ACP-EEC relationship. 162 In practice, the Convention
has proved durable and popular. Original ACP membership has grown
from 46 to 64 countries. 68
The enduring nature of trade patterns 64 linking Europe and her for-
mer colonies reflects the strength of the economic and cultural bonds be-
tween the states. Despite past inequities,' 65 severing trade ties developed
over centuries would be disasterous for the economic growth of the states
concerned. The ACP states should seek instead to create a working part-
nership with the EEC. As with any business relationship, the partnership
must be economically attractive to all parties concerned.
B. ACP-EEC Partnership Under the Proposed Safeguard System
The proposed safeguard system preserves the EEC's legitimate inter-
est in protecting its internal economies from sudden disturbances in com-
petitive conditions. Unlike the present arrangement, the alternative sug-
gested allows ACP states to plan their external trade with greater
certainty. Moreover, ACP states are afforded significant additional lever-
age in negotiating terms under which foreign direct investment projects
160 Concluding that significant change in the pattern of ACP-EEC trade is unlikely,
Kojo Yelpaala emphasizes the effect of non-tariff barriers, safeguard clauses and bilateral
agreements between ACP states and the EEC countries. See Yelpaala, supra note 16.
Other writers have voiced similar concerns about the Lom6 agreements. See Dolan,
supra note 100; Shaw, EEC-ACP Interactions and Images as Redefinitions of Eurafrica:
Exemplary Exclusive and/or Exploitative?, 18 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 135 (1979).
SCHOLARS IN THE ACP STATES HAVE ALSO CRITICIZED THE LOMAI AGREEMENTS. See
Nabudere, Stabilization of Export Earnings ("Stabex") in the Lomg Convention, 13 U.
Ghana L.J. 59 (1976); see also Botchwey, The ACP-EEC Convention-New Order, or Old
Order with a New Face, 13 U. Ghana L.J. 133 (1976); SAwYERR, Industrial Co-operation
under the ACP-EEC Convention of Lomb, 13 U. Ghana L.J. 93 (1976).
161 In an article voicing sharp criticism of Lom6 I, Dolan concedes that "the [EEC]
Commission's Directorate for development policy, in particular, and many others associated
with the Community, and in the Member States, are deeply concerned with development
problems." Dolan, supra note 100, at 393.
162 Gruh, supra note 67, at 259.
6 See supra notes 2 and 89. Moreover, Angola and Mozambique are expected to sign
Lom6 HI. The Courier, No. 82, AT I (Nov./DEc. 1983).
16 See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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within their boundaries will operate. The ACP states' ability to offer
guaranteed access to the EEC, for direct investors whose exports satisfy
the rules of origin, would materially improve the attraction of ACP states
as direct investment targets.
Finally, the establishment of guaranteed export ceilings would-recog-
nize three factors obscured by the Lom6 relationship. First, the economic
structure of the ACP states is such that trade preferences limited by
traditional safeguard provisions provide little opportunity for increasing
trade growth.-16 Notwithstanding the Lom6 objective of upgrading ACP
trade, the market access provisions have proved ineffective.1 67 Second, the
Lom6 relationship should not hamper the ACP states' ability to attract
investment from third party states. The rules of origin are structured to
favor EEC firms operating in ACP states.6 8 The safeguard clauses them-
selves are unlikely to be invoked against EEC firms. 69 By agreeing to
accept a fixed quota of manufactured exports, the EEC will recognize that
investment from third party states may be necessary to permit ACP
states to make use of the market access provisions. Third, by recognizing
that despite the unequal nature of the existing trade pattern, the EEC is
willing to accept only a limited number of manufactured products ex-
ported from ACP states, the ACP-EEC partnership will be placed on a
more realistic footing. While Europe has renounced the coercive practices
of the past, 70 negotiations fixing an export ceiling will underscore the
pragmatic limitations on the EEC's benevolence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Europe's trade with Africa was originally defined through the use of
superior military and economic force. Since World War II, however,
Europeans have increasingly sought to justify their commercial and polit-
ical relations with Africa on ethical grounds. Former colonies were inte-
grated into the EEC on a unilateral basis under the association system. In
exchange for the right to export raw materials to the EEC free of import
duties, Associated Stat~s extended corresponding preferences to EEC
Member States on a non-discriminating basis.
Lom6 I and H provided for increased aid to the developing countries
trading with the EEC, along with preferential market access provisions
and an attempt to create a North-South partnership. Throughout the as-
sociation and partnership periods, African trade with Europe retained its
6' See supra notes 86-88 and 139-41 and accompanying text.
167 Id.
I" McQueen, supra note 11, at 177.
169 Id. at 128.
170 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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initial character-African states supplied raw materials and imported
manufactured goods.
Through the safeguard clauses of Lom6 I and II, the EEC has re-
tained the power to act unilaterally to suspend the market access provi-
sions extended to developing nations. The EEC's broad power to act in
the face of a threatened disruption to its economy may unjustly interfere
with the ability of ACP states to plan their economies and attract invest-
ment from non-EEC developed nations.
A preferable alternative would provide for multilateral negotiations
fixing industry-specific export ceilings, below which ACP producers would
be guaranteed access to EEC markets. Application .of safeguard measures
to ACP exports below the export ceiling would entitle the ACP producer
to compensation. Under such an arrangement, the ACP states would be
empowered to make more effective use of the market access provisions.
